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Abstract 
Wireless networks are becoming a pervasive element of today's computing. With 
this growth a new type of network is being researched, the ad-hoc network. Wireless ad-hoc 
networks bring the advantage of flexibility because of the dynamic way that they are formed 
and left. Looking at these networks, with scenarios such as a tactical battlefield in mind, 
gives rise to many security issues. Because of the relative newness of wireless ad-hoc 
networks there is no standard routing protocol for the network layer. Many protocols have 
been proposed, and this thesis will examine one of the more popular protocols, Ad-hoc On-
Demand Distance Vector Routing. With the growing need for security in mind, an analysis 
of this protocol will be done with relation to the security threats that are prevalent on today's 
tactical wireless networks. This will then determine the usability of the protocol in such 
environments were security is a key factor. 
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Chapter l: Problem Statement 
Ad-hoc Wireless Networks 
Wireless networking is quickly becoming pervasive in today's society and 
commercial market. Because of the potential this creates for industry, the research being 
done on wireless networks is an increasingly interesting field. The commercial applications 
currently sold range from voice over wireless data networks to mobile IEEE 802.11 [ 11 ] 
networks being installed in buildings as the network infrastructure. An interesting branch of 
wireless networking is ad-hoc networking, where the network topology is dynamic based on 
the location of communicating partners. This creates many advantages for disaster relief 
situations, for the military, and for commercial applications by providing a network that is 
easily setup and harder to physically disrupt than wired networks. However, along with the 
great advantages in flexibility of ad-hoc networks, they by and large lack security (i.e. 
privacy and confidentiality). Because of the ease in which these networks are formed and the 
trust relationship inherent in ad-hoc networks, they are easily compromised. This creates a 
problem when confidential information or even life depending information can be 
compromised. The focus of this thesis is to examine the background of ad-hoc network 
routing protocols, and expose security flaws and trust relationships within one particular ad-
hoc network routing protocol which is Ad-Hoc on Demand Distance Vector Routing or 
AODV. 
Thesis Goals 
The main objective of this thesis is the systematic study of the popular AODV 
wireless routing protocol in order to evaluate its ability to support secure communications. 
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In support of that goal this thesis is divided into four parts. Chapter 2 examines current ad-
hoc network routing protocols with regard to the underlying algorithms for route discovery 
and message delivery. The third chapter entails a detailed demonstration of the route 
discovery of one of the more popular routing protocols, the AODV protocol. From there the 
security vulnerabilities of the wireless networking environment are described. Finally, the 
security vulnerabilities of the wireless environment are mapped to the AODV protocol for 
analysis of AODV's security properties. 
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Chapter 2: Background on Wireless Network Routing Protocols 
2.1 Wireless Ad-hoc Networks 
Wireless networks are becoming increasingly prevalent in the world today. With the 
increased availability and reduced prices, it is now economical for end users to set up and 
maintain their own wireless networks. The increase in use of wireless networks has not just 
been limited to the private sector. Many useful applications of wireless are becoming a 
reality in medicine, automotives, and the military. The main focus of this thesis is on ad-hoc 
wireless networks. An ad-hoc wireless network is two or more devices with wireless 
networking capability that create apeer-to-peer network [1]. An example of a simple ad-hoc 
wireless network is shown in Figure 1. Most ad-hoc networks are comprised of many nodes 
or mobile hosts (MH) each with their own transmission range. 
As is depicted by Figure 1, the circles indicate the transmission ranges that each 
contain the mobile hosts. The node in the middle (mobile host B, or MHb) is necessary for 
communications to take place across the network because it is encompassed in both spheres 
of communication. If the three nodes on the right-hand side of the network move away such 
that mobile host B is no longer in the communications circle of mobile hosts A and C, then 
the ad-hoc network is broken and communications can no longer take place over the entire 
network. The network these devices form differs from other wireless networks because there 
is no set infrastructure. Each device is capable of routing, packet forwarding, and connecting 
to any other device in its range. This flexibility allows ad-hoc wireless networks to operate 
in multiple situations where a regular wired network would fail. Wireless ad-hoc networks 
also allow for groups to exchange information quickly in cases such as board meeting 
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presentations. The advantages wireless ad-hoc networks create suggests that further research 
on the properties and capabilities be done in this field. 
Figure 1— An Ad-hoc Network 
2.2 Introduction to Routing Protocols 
Routing protocols play a crucial role in the operation of wireless networks, because 
the wireless routing protocols are by and large based on reliability and performance 
assumptions for a wired infrastructure. Depending upon the protocol used, it may create 
many advantages or disadvantages in the wireless network, which will be discussed in 
Section 2.5. l~Zany of the protocols developed for wireless networks came from adaptations 
in wired network routing protocols [ 1 ] . 
These adaptations in wireless routing protocols are categorized into two approaches 
[1]. The first approach is table driven, where routing information from every node is 
broadcast to all other nodes. Each node locally maintains routing table information about the 
entire network. The two common table driven protocols discussed in this thesis are: The 
Destination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV), and The Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP). 
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The second approach to routing is an on-demand method, where a route is created 
only when a sending node requires it. The on-demand protocols discussed in this thesis are: 
The Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV), The Temporally Ordered Routing 
Algorithm (TORA), and The Dynamic Source Routing (DSR). This analysis will describe 
each algorithm, demonstrate the operation of two of the algorithms, and then discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of the routing protocols. Advantages and disadvantages are 
discussed toclarify the choice of a particular protocol to route messages because of the 
significant impact on the robustness and security of the entire communication system the 
routing protocol creates. 
2.3 Ad-hoc Routing Protocol Algorithms 
DSDV 
The DSDV routing algorithm is essentially the Bellman-Ford algorithm [ 13] adapted 
for the dynamics of ad-hoc wireless networks [2]. In DSDV, each node maintains a routing 
table containing all possible destinations, the number of routing hops, and the next hop node 
for each destination. Routing updates of two types are sent throughout the network 
periodically by all nodes. 
The first of these types is a full dump routing update. This update carries all routing 
information each node has available. The second update is incremental, where only 
information on routes that have changed is exchanged. The updates are controlled by 
sequence numbering which allow the receiving nodes to determine by comparison of the 
sequence numbers whether the update is current. Because the route table is always current, 
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requests for routes are satisfied locally with a simple table lookup and no network 
communication (i.e. no additional network traffic) is needed to determine a path. 
WRP 
WRP is another table driven routing algorithm. WRP uses a novel approach to avoid 
the count-to-infinity problem (wherein a group of nodes exchange routing information that 
continually increases the distance by one, until the distance for a certain path "reaches" 
infinity) by forcing each node to check the consistency of its predecessor [ 1 ]. Here the 
routing table is created by adding entries to the table whenever a node identifies traffic such 
as acknowledgements and messages from its neighbors. If a node identifies a neighbor, the 
neighbor is added to the table and the node's tables are broadcast to the new neighbor. All 
nodes must broadcast at least a `Hello' message, periodically informing the network that the 
node exists. 
The four tables maintained by each node are: the distance table, the routing table, the 
link cost table, and the message retransmission table [6]. The distance table maintains the 
number of hops between the node and the destination. The routing table keeps a list of the 
next hop nodes. The link cost table is a listing of the delay for each link. The message 
retransmission list is used to keep track of update messages as they are sent after a node 
senses a link status change. 
AODV 
In Ad-Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing, routes are deternuned at the time of 
need by requests from the source node [3). In AODV, when a node sends information it 
initiates a route request (RREQ) broadcast. Each of these RREQs have a unique sequence 
number to prevent looping. While forwarding a RREQ, intermediate nodes create entries for 
their neighbors in a temporary routing table. Any duplicate RREQs as per the unique 
sequence number are dropped to avoid broadcast storming. Once the destination is reached, 
a route reply (R:REP) is sent back. Each node on the forward path has set up timers as the 
R:REQ was passed on, to facilitate route reply and route expiration. When the source 
receives confirmation of the route through the RREP, it begins to send information along that 
path. If the source node moves, it must reinitiate a RREQ to continue transmitting. If a node 
in the path moves, the upstream node must propagate a link failure. AODV also allows for 
periodic `Hello' messages to be broadcast so its neighbors know which nodes are within its 
communications circle. In AODV the route is chosen according to the newest sequence 
numbers and the symmetrical status of the links. 
TORA 
Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA) is a Global Position System (GPS) 
based algorithm that uses position to help determine an optimal route [4]. TORA is also a 
source initiated routing algorithm, therefore a transmitting node creates a directed acyclic 
graph (DAG) when initiating a transmission. The DAG is a graph that is rooted at the 
destination node and is created similarly to the query/reply process of Light Weight Mobile 
Routing[1]. Routes are created using a height metric that assigns each node in the DAG a 
downstream or upstream position. If a node moves, a new reference level in the DAG is 
defined. If a node wishes to be erased from the DAG, it broadcasts a CLR. 
DSR 
Dynamic Source Routing is the final protocol to be discussed. It is a source initiated 
on-demand protocol. DSR [5] works as follows: If a source node has a packet to send, it 
checks its route cache. Ultimately, messages are transmitted along an unexpired route. If no 
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route is available, it broadcasts an RREQ similar to AODV. Each receiving node checks its 
cache for a route and when failing to locate a route adds its own address to the route record 
on the RREQ and rebroadcasts. When the destination node. or a node containing a path is 
reached, that node initiates an RREP. This can be an asymmetric protocol because the 
destination node can initiate its own path discovery back to the source, node, and use it upon 
confirmation of a better return route. The other feature of DSR is route maintenance. To 
perform route maintenance, a route error packet is utilized between nodes on a broken link to 
repair the route. 
2.4 Routing Algorithm Examples 
DSDV 
As mobile hosts come online, each will eventually receive a copy of the current 
routing tables from their neighbors. Using that information and whatever metric is desired 
for best route choice, the newest mobile host updates its own tables from the received tables. 
Therefore, after routing tables have been exchanged between MHa, MHb, MHO, MHO, and 
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Figure 2 - An Example Wireless Ad-hoc Network 
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through full routing table dumps, any movement by any of the hosts will require only 
incremental changes to be sent out. Table 1 is an example of a partial DSDV routing table 
that corresponds to the mobile hosts in Figure 2. The metric for route selection used in 
DSDV depends upon the implementation of DSDV. Table 1 is the table that would be 
broadcast by MHa on a full dump. As is shown each entry corresponds to one of the nodes in 
the ad-hoc network. Therefore, whenever MHa whishes to transmit to another mobile host a 
lookup of the destination node reveals where the next hop is for that destination. This lookup 
also reveals a metric that is utilized when comparing routing table updates that have been 
received from the network. Looking at Figure 2 and Table 1, if mobile host A wishes to 
transmit a packet to mobile host E, all that is required of MHa is a simple table query to see 
that the next hop for MHe is MHb. MHa can then transmit its data to MHb to be routed to 
MHe. 
Table 1—Sample DSDV Routing Table 
Destination NextHop Metric 
A A 0 
B B 1 
C C 1.5 
D B 2 
E B 3 
AODV 
The steps are significantly different for AODV route discovery than DSDV. If mobile 
host A wishes to transmit data to mobile host E (Figure 2) using the AODV routing protocol, 
first MHa broadcasts a route request. MHb and MHO both receive the route request and check 
their cache to see if a route has recently been opened to the destination node E. If not then 
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MHb and MHO rebroadcast the route request. MHa, MHb, and MHO will all receive the 
rebroadcasted route requests, but will discard the RREQs based on a comparison of sequence 
numbers that are part of the routing tables. MHd will see the route request and again check 
the cache for a route to MHe. When no route is again found, it will broadcast the route 
request again. Any previous hosts receiving this request will ignore it again based on the 
sequence number. MHe finally receives the route request then sends a route reply back to 
MHa. This route reply is forwarded back through the route to MHa using the forward path set 
up from the route request as long as the timers on the forward path have not expired. MHa
finally receives the route reply and the path for data is established between MHa and MHe. 
2.5 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Routing Protocols 
Table Driven Routing Protocols 
The foremost advantage a table driven algorithm has is that all of its routes are 
precomputed. This is an advantage in a tactical network because nodes do not need to 
exchange potentially large routing tables before each message. Another advantage to these 
routing schemes is that important equipment such as weapons systems can decline to forward 
traffic; therefore traffic would not be routed through critical systems. 
A disadvantage of the table driven approaches of DSDV and WRP is that both table 
driven protocols require frequent communication between nodes to keep the contents of the 
routing tables current. In a mobile environment where most nodes are operating with limited 
battery life, energy requirements can cause problems. These protocols consume a significant 
amount of power simply passing updates of entire routing tables. If a mobile host is in sleep 
mode, its entire routing table will be expired when it awakens. Another major disadvantage 
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is that when the movement of the nodes is great, most of the bandwidth will be taken up by 
route updates, which are tables, as opposed to actual data. 
On-Demand Routing Protocols 
The foremost advantage of on-demand routing is that all the routes are computed only 
when needed. Therefore, the overhead is very small when the nodes are not exchanging 
large amounts of data or moving during transmissions such that new routes must be created. 
Also, if transmissions between nodes increase, previous routes are cached for a period of 
time to help ease route discovery time. Another advantage of on-demand routing occurs in 
DSR where the links can be asymmetric. This is ideal for nodes that need to save power, 
because of the potential for a better one-way route back to the source node that DSR would 
be able to utilize. 
One point that is both an advantage and a disadvantage in a tactical communications 
network is that TORA utilizes GPS. This could be a benefit to keeping track of nodes, but 
also a hazard by disclosing their location. As with table driven approaches, critical systems 
can also be protected from having traffic routed through them in on-demand routing. 
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Chapter 3: The AODV Protocol in Detail 
To more clearly understand the security issues of AODV, it is helpful to study an 
example route discovery. This section of the thesis is devoted to looking at the AODV 
protocol in detail. To accomplish the task, this section will examine the packets used in route 
creation, the routing tables that are created during a route discovery process, and finally 
demonstrate the process using the data structures defined to explain the route discovery 
process in detail. 
AODV uses two types of messages to find and establish a route employing the two 
packets shown in Figures 3 and 4. These are the packets being generated between each node 
as the route discovery is taking place. The packet formats for the Route Request (RREQ) 
and the Route Reply (RREP) are additionally wrapped in an IP packet for exchange between 
the nodes[3]. 
For this example it is assumed when a message is broadcast the IP layer will use the 
broadcasting node's IP as the source in the IP packet, and 255.255.255.0 as the broadcast 
destination in the IP layer. This packet is then wrapped around the RREQ and RREP 
packets. In addition to these two packet types, soft route tables (because the tables are 
associated with a timer so that they are able to expire) are generated at each node (Figure 5) 
for route retention and quicker recovery from link breakage. This section will further detail 
the packet types, routing tables, and then show a detailed example of what is occurring when 
a route is being found. 
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3.1 The Route Request Packet (RREQ) 
In Figure 3, the fields are defined as follows by [3]: 
Type - is equal to 1 for an RREQ 
Flags -are used in multicasting operations as well as control functions 
Rsv -Sent as 0 and ignored on reception 
Hop Count -The number of hops from the Originator IP Address to the node 
handling the request 
RREQ ID - A sequence number uniquely identifying the particular RREQ when taken 
in conjunction with the originating node's IP address 
Destination IP Address -The IP address of the destination for which a route is desired 
Destination Sequence Number -The greatest sequence number received in the past by 
the originator for any route towards the destination 
Originator IP Address -The IP address of the node which originated the Route 
Request 
Originator Sequence Number -The current sequence number to be used for route 
entries pointing to (and generated by) the originator of the route request. 
For the purpose of this example demonstration it is possible to disregard all but the 
important information in the RREQ packet while doing the demonstration. Therefore a 
sample packet will look like this: <RREQ, Hop Count, RREQ ID, Dest. IP, Dest. Seq. #, 
Orig. IP, Orig. Seq. #>. 
Type Flags Rsv Hop Count 
RREQ ID
Destination IP Address 
Destination Sequence Number 
Originator IP Address 
Originator Sequence Number 
Figure 3 —Route Request Packet Format RREQ 
3.2 The Route Reply Packet (RREP) 
Looking at the RREP packet (Figure 4), the fields are defined as follows by [3]: 
Type - is equal to 2 for an RREP 
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Flags -used for multicasting and acknowledgment requests 
Rsv —same as in RREQ 
Prefix Size - If nonzero, the 5-bit Prefix Size specifies that the indicated next hop may 
be used for any nodes with the same routing prefix (as defined by the Prefix Size) as 
the requested destination 
Hop Count -The number of hops from the Originator IP Address to the Destination 
IP Address 
Destination IP Address -The IP address of the destination for which a route is 
supplied 
Destination Sequence Number -The destination sequence number associated to the 
route 
Originator IP Address -The IP address of the node which originated the RREQ for 
which the route is supplied 
Lifetime -The time in milliseconds for which nodes receiving the RREP consider the 
route to be valid. 
For the purpose of this example demonstration it is also possible to disregard all but 
the important information in the RREP packet while doing the walkthrough. Therefore a 
sample packet will look like this: <RREP, Hop Count, RREQ ID, Dest. IP, Dest. Seq. #, 
Orig. IP, Lifetime Orig. Seq. #>. 
Type Flags Rsv Prefix Sz Hop Count 
RREQ ID 
Destination IP Address 
Destination Sequence Number 
Originator IP Address 
Lifetime 
Figure 4 —Route Reply Packet Format RREP 
3.3 The Soft State Routing Table 
The routing tables in AODV are termed soft state because there is a timer associated 
with each table. This timer enables the soft state tables to expire so that routes are fresh. The 
soft state routing table (Figure 5) is filled with the above information that is provided in the 
RREQ and RREP packets. Therefore, the only new fields seen in the routing table are: 
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Interface —which interface the packet came in on, Next Hop —the next hop to the destination, 
and List of Precursors —used for upstream notification in case of link failure. 
Destination IP Address 
Destination Sequence Number 
Valid Destination Sequence Number 
Interface 
Hop Count (number of hops needed to reach destination} 
Next Hop 
List of Precursors (described in Section 5.2) 
Lifetime (expiration or deletion time of the route} 
Routing Flags 
State 
Figure 5 —Example Routing Table 
3.4 The Example Route Discovery Walkthrou~h 
Figure 6 is the five node network that will be utilized as the example in this 
demonstration. The ranges of communication are designated by the circles, and are bi-
directional. 
Figure 6 —Example Wireless Network For AODV W alkthrough 
Mobile host A (MHa) wishes to send a message to mobile host D (MHd). This will be 
accomplished using the Ad-Hoc On Demand Distance Vector Routing protocol. The first 
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step in this process is that MHa generates a RREQ with its IP address in the originator field 
and MHd's IP address in the destination field of the RREQ. MHa then broadcasts the RREQ 
as shown in Figure 6a. 
n,~r~~ 
Figure 6a —The First Broadcasted RREQ 
Mobile hosts E, B, and C (MHe, MHb, MHO) receive the RREQ from MHa. The three hosts 
that received the broadcasted RREQ will first check their routing tables to see if they 
currently have a route to MHd. If they did not previously have a route they then create two 
new entries in their routing tables. One of the entries will be for MHa, and the other will be 
for the forward path to MHd. All three mobile hosts will then rebroadcast the RREQ as 
shown in Figure 6b. 
Figure 6b —The Next Broadcast of RREQ 
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MHa will discard the three RREQs it receives back, because of the RREQ ID and the 
originator address it knows this is the. same RREQ it has already sent. MHb and MHO will 
also discard the RREQs that they receive from each other, respectively, because they know 
that they have also received them. However, they do add an entry for each other in their 
routing tables. MHd receives both RREQs and sees that MHa is trying to establish a route to 
it. MHd then updates its routing tables with the RREQs it received. Then, depending on 
which RREQ arrived first and the sequence number in that RREQ, MHd will unicast a RREP 
back along the forward path it has chosen, as shown in Figure 6c. 
r~dH~ 
r~.aw:~ 
F?PEP'(C},~1 r,nHb ! ~ F~EF'~C'~~) 
f„1Hc 
Figure 6c —The Route Reply Unicasts 
As shown in Figure 6c, MHd has chosen the route through MHb. Therefore it unicasts 
a RREP back to MHb. MHb then queries its routing table and utilizes the forward path back to 
MHa and unicasts the RREP back to MHa. Upon receiving the RREP, MHa may then begin 
to communicate along this route with MHd. The other entries for the forward paths that were 
created by the RREQ in MHe and MHO will eventually timeout. However, it is useful for 
those entries to be present for a certain amount of time in case of a link breakage so that a 
new route may be quickly established. 
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Chapter 4: Wireless Ad-Hoc Network Security Issues 
The goal of computer security is most commonly defined to be the protection of 
information as addressed by confidentiality, integrity, and availability [7]. Using these 
characteristics, the threats to wireless ad-hoc networks are classified. By developing a 
clearer understanding of the threats posed to wireless ad-hoc networks, the security is further 
improved. The following sections define the three goals of computer security and examples 
of threats to each characteristic. 
4.1 Threats to Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is a prime aspect of computer security. Only authorized parties 
should be granted access to assets of a computer system. The leakage of information or 
location of sensitive computer assets could have devastating effects on companies, countries, 
or militaries [8] . Even routing information in ad-hoc networks must at times be kept 
confidential to protect the assets. Some of the threats to confidentiality are: eavesdropping, 
failures in authentication, failures in key management, and compromised mobile nodes. 
Eavesdropping 
V~ireless networks are broadcast in nature. This means all transmissions can be 
received by anyone within range of a transmitting node. This factor poses a significant 
problem to confidentiality. If mobile host A wishes to transmit a message to mobile host B, 
it broadcasts that message with mobile host B as the receiving address. Because most ad-hoc 
routing protocols do not employ encryption, mobile host C will be able to intercept the 
message. Even if the message contents are encrypted, mobile host C will still be able to 
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determine that there are two hosts A and B talking. Therefore the tactic of eavesdropping in 
wireless ad-hoc networks is easy to perform and difficult to prevent. 
The confidentiality of routing information follows very closely with eavesdropping. 
Because most routing protocols do not employ some sort of encryption, the routing 
information transmitted is clearly visible within the transmitting range. If routes are being 
exchanged, in some routing protocols this might give away sensitive information about 
location, or even disclose major activities about to take place. This information is given 
away by routing protocols that utilize on demand route discovery. Therefore the routing 
information must be kept highly confidential. 
Failures in Authentication 
The inherit property of an ad-hoc network is that people can join and leave a group at 
anytime. This poses many problems for authentication of a mobile host. The proposal to 
correct authentication in wireless ad-hoc networks is for a key to be given to all parties that 
will be forming the network before they connect [ l o] . This is done by letting all of the users 
know a certain pass phrase that will be used to authenticate all communications either 
through digital signatures or encryption. 
The main security problem of authentication is solved by using this method. 
However, it leaves many security risks. The first is that the key phrase is compromised, i.e. 
someone leaves it written down somewhere. The second vulnerability is that a node may be 
compromised through theft of the mobile device. This creates a problem for confidentiality 
when the wrong people are authenticated or gain authentication through the aforementioned 
ways. They then have access to the information being shared by the ad-hoc network. This 
compromises confidentiality. 
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Failures in Key Management 
Even in wired networks, key management or key distribution poses a significant 
problem. The overhead generated even on a wired network by key distribution makes it 
difficult to propose an algorithm that will efficiently distribute the keys. Even when keys are 
distributed, the problem remains of updating the keys and switching to the new key at the 
proper time such that all the traffic is being encrypted with the correct key [7]. The problem 
of key management is also closely tied to authentication. In wireless ad-hoc networks there 
is no distribution center readily available to control key exchanges, and the scalability of 
exchanging a symmetric key with a changing number of mobile nodes makes that scheme 
also difficult. These security problems are compounded by the fact that mobile nodes are 
much more easily compromised through theft, or if a member of the ad-hoc network leaves 
they still possess the ability to communicate with the group even though they no longer 
should, because they retain the key. 
These key management problems are at the very heart of confidentiality because if 
key management did work easily, efficiently and correctly, only the proper parties would be 
able to view the messages being transmitted, whereas with the security issues of key 
management unauthorized users might be eavesdropping. 
Compromised Mobile Nodes 
Looking at two scenarios compromised mobile nodes breach confidentiality. The 
first scenario is the theft of a mobile device. This device might still be authorized to engage 
in communications with the ad-hoc group. This allows an attacker to view confidential 
information about other nodes present such as keys, passwords, or configurations. The 
second scenario is closely tied to theft, but is more military in nature. If a node is discovered 
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by the enemy and captured, it compromises the confidentiality of the system by allowing the 
enemy to gain access to location and other highly sensitive information. 
4.2 Threats to Inte~rit_y 
The integrity of data is maintained when only authorized parties are allowed to 
modify the information in authorized ways. This includes routing information, files, 
computers, and broadcast traffic. Integrity also depends on assets not being corrupted during 
transmission. Threats to integrity include man-in-the-middle attacl~s, corrupted nodes, 
impersonation, and spoofing. 
Man-in-the-Middle Attack 
Man-in-the-middle attacks are a security risk in ad-hoc networks because the majority 
of routing protocols rely on the integrity of nodes when searching for a route. A man-in-the-
middle attack occurs when a malicious user inserts itself into a route or flow of data and then 
gains control of the flow of traffic between two communicating nodes [7] . For example, if 
mobile host A wishes to talk to mobile host B, it uses route discovery or looks up in the 
routing table directing it how to get there. If mobile host C has maliciously inserted him or 
her self into the route then mobile host C will be able to see the data being passed between A 
and B, and either hijack the session, change or corrupt the data. Even if the payload is 
encrypted, mobile host C can still corrupt the payload and disrupt the integrity of the 
communication. 
Corrupted Nodes 
Corrupted nodes are either nodes being purposefully malicious by using man-in-the-
middle tactics to change the payload data of a transmission, or they might be distributing 
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false routing information. In each case the corrupted node is compromising the integrity of 
not only the communications, but of the entire ad-hoc network. If false routing information 
is being distributed by a corrupted node by stating that some nodes are unreachable or that all 
traffic should come through the corrupted node, then the integrity of the entire ad-hoc 
network is compromised. 
Impersonation 
when a node actively pretends to be another node on the network such that all the 
nodes on the network believe that it belongs to the group this is defined as impersonation. 
By taking the identity as a member of an ad-hoc network, a malicious user becomes a trusted 
part of the network. This affects the integrity of the network because this user is allowed to 
transmit any false information they wish, or launch aman-in-the-middle attack as a trusted 
user and actively corrupt data. Impersonation as defined by [8] is "...concerns all critical 
operations in ad-hoc network...by accessing or destroying data that is stored or being 
exchanged... and causing permanent damage to other nodes or services." This greatly affects 
the integrity of the wireless ad-hoc network because if the nodes, services, or data provided 
by the network are damaged, then the trust relationship that the network depends upon for its 
integrity is obsolete. 
Spoofing 
The integrity of schemes that rely on the MAC or IP address for authentication can be 
compromised through address spoofing. By changing the MAC or IP address a person can 
either impersonate a valid user and damage the integrity of the ad-hoc network, or they can 
again change routing information to go to the invalid or spoofed address again compromising 
communications. 
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4.3 Threats to Availability 
The availability of wireless ad-hoc networks is a precious commodity. Wireless 
networks are advantageous over wired networks because natural disasters or man-made 
interruptions make it easier to take down a wired system than a wireless. However, there are 
still many factors affecting the availability of a wireless system. Denial of service attacks, 
improper key management, sleep deprivation, and frequency j amming can all affect the 
availability of an ad-hoc network. 
Denial of Service Attacks 
The availability of a wireless ad-hoc network is greatly compromised by denial of 
service attacks. Because of the distributed nature of an ad-hoc network, there is no main 
central point of failure for a malicious user to target. However, the vulnerability to ad-hoc 
networks lies in the routing protocols themselves. Enough traffic can be generated such that 
routing updates or route finding cannot take place, which prevents new nodes from joining 
the ad-hoc network. Existing nodes will no longer be able to communicate, effectively 
shutting down the availability of the wireless ad-hoc network. These attacks can also take 
place on a smaller scale in the form of route spoofing, impeding communication from taking 
place between a few nodes in the system. A malicious attacker effectively partitions an ad-
hoc network in this manner. 
In a tactical situation, if the ad-hoc network becomes partitioned, then smaller groups 
will no longer receive commands or status updates and could be easily targeted because the 
smaller group will have been broken away from communicating with the main force. 
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Improper Key Management 
Key management falls into all three categories of risks to security. The availability of 
a network can be damaged by improper key management during times of key updates. If all 
the parties of the ad-hoc network do not receive the new key, or they change to the new key 
at the improper time, then they will no longer be able to communicate with the rest of the 
network. Key management might also hamper the availability of a wireless ad-hoc network 
if too much traffic is being generated by the key management protocol. If all network 
resources are being utilized to update and process key changes, then no actual data will be 
communicated between the parties of the ad-hoc network. 
Sleep Deprivation 
The main goal of sleep deprivation is to cause power drain on the battery of a mobile 
system. Sleep deprivation as described in [9] can occur if a host is repeatedly informed that 
it must stay awake. This takes place if another mobile host has been holding data for the host 
that wishes to sleep, and keeps sending it instructions to stay awake so it can receive this 
data, but then never transmitting any data. Certain protocols also force hosts to stay awake at 
beacon intervals. By beaconing in a manner the host never has the ability to enter sleep 
mode, it is deprived of its ability to conserve power. In wireless ad-hoc networks, power is a 
key issue. If hosts are not allowed to conserve power, they quickly drain their batteries 
reducing the longevity of the wireless ad-hoc network and compromising its availability. 
Frequency Jamming 
Frequency j amming is primarily a physical layer issue. By overpowering the 
frequency on which the wireless ad-hoc network is operating, because of the broadcast nature 
of the network, this creates a situation where no hosts are able to transmit. This can be 
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overcome in at least two ways at the physical layer. The first is through the use of frequency 
hopping such that no single frequency is used for an extended period, effectively disabling 
jamming. The second is through digital sequence spread spectrum. This allows a 
transmitting node to distribute the transmissions almost making them look like the 
background noise. 
4.4 Summary 
In summary the major threats are eavesdropping, failures in key management, failures 
in authentication, compromised mobile nodes, man-in-the-middle attacks, corrupted nodes, 
impersonation, spoofing, denial-of-service attacks, sleep deprivation, and frequency 
jamming. As is shown there are many security threats to ad-hoc wireless networks. The next 
step is to examine the AODV protocol against these threats and ascertain whether or not the 
protocol as defined is suitable for secure communications. 
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Chapter 5: Analyzing the Security Weaknesses of AODV 
Now that the underlying algorithm of the AODV protocol has been examined, and 
security issues of ad-hoc wireless networks have been explored, the next step is to take a look 
at how the AODV protocol measures up against security threats. This will be accomplished 
by looking at each security threat and seeing if AODV allows these threats to confidentiality, 
threats to integrity, and threats to availability to occur. Thereby, uncovering an important 
trust relationship in AODV. 
5.1 Threats to Confidentiality 
Eavesdropping 
Eavesdropping can occur easily to the AODV protocol which greatly compromises 
the confidentiality of routing information. Because there is no requirement for encryption in 
the routing protocol itself, all of the messages can be seen by any party. This ensures that 
any `Hello' beacons broadcast by the AODV protocol will reveal which nodes are in the 
network. Also, when hosts are trying to find a route to a destination, the routing information 
broadcast in the RREQ and RREP will be visible to a malicious eavesdropper. This routing 
information can not only give an attacker information as to what data is being transferred and 
between whom, but it also lets the attackers know when an increase in communication is 
taking place. 
Another key point is that AODV provides upstream notification when a link is 
broken. Figure 7 shows an example network where MHe moves from behind MHO to behind 
MHd. When this occurs, MHO notifies MHa that MHe is no longer in the same position. MHb 
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will overhear this notification and see the new route created through MHd. Therefore, an 
eavesdropper will know when a node is moving, and can determine where it resides when the 
new path is discovered, making the mobile host vulnerable to physical attacks. 
hdH~ f=
h,1He' 
r~1aw~~~n~rrt ~~ r~1H 
Figure 7 - Example of 1~lovement Notification 
This gives an eavesdropper the ability to discern movement within the network and uncover 
directions, locations, or missions the group is moving towards. A possible solution for this is 
to utilize IPSEC (IP Security) [7] or some other fol~~i of payload encryption, because the 
AODV protocol is wrapped inside of the IP protocol. 
Authentication 
The AODV protocol does not address authentication of mobile hosts. However, it 
does provide, in a section at the end of the protocol, a description that if there are pre-
established security associations, then AODV should be able to use the same authentication 
mechanisms based on their IP address [3]. This does not allow for strong authentication. 
Authentication based on IP has proved time and again to be a weak and insecure form of 
authentication, because of the ease of spoofing an IP address. Therefore authentication is left 
up to other layers by AODV. This leaves the confidentiality of the network in jeopardy if 
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mobile hosts are not authenticated. However, if AODV is running on top of IEEE 802.11 
[ 11 ] there is a scheme present for authentication in that protocol, but it still contains many 
security holes. The authentication provided by IEEE 802.11 is merely apass/challenge 
scheme that authenticates in one direction and for only one hop. 
Key Management 
The issue of key management is closely tied to the authentication issue in AODV. 
Because there is no specific way to authenticate, key management cannot be trusted, because 
none of the mobile hosts are authenticated including the key manager. This creates a chasm 
in the security of AODV. If keys cannot be distributed, then no traffic in the network can be 
encrypted, and therefore the confidentiality of the network is compromised. However, this 
might be circumvented using strong application layer end-to-end encryption. The problem 
with this approach is that it does not scale well and utilizes a large amount of bandwidth. 
Compromised Mobile Nodes 
The confidentiality exposed when a mobile node is compromised by theft is near 
impossible to contain in any protocol. AODV does take one step that allows for the 
notification of route failures in a blacklist set. This could be adapted to allow for mobile 
nodes to blacklist any rogue nodes and no longer utilize them in data transmissions or path 
findings. 
5.2 Threats to Inte~rit_y 
Man-in-the-Middle Attacks 
The AODV protocol is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, and in fact, these 
attacks can be carried out with ease. Because the traffic is not encrypted and little or no 
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authentication of the nodes takes place, it is easy for a node to insert itself into a route 
between two hosts. This can be accomplished in AODV because there is little check on the 
sequence numbers used to establish which route is the best. If the attacker can determine the 
other metrics as well as the sequence number used to choose the best route, then there is 
nothing in the protocol to prevent a malicious host from asserting itself as having the best 
route. This is shown in Figure 8. 
Figure 8 —Example of Man-in-the-l~~7iddle Attack 
The nodes of this network are. MHa, MHd, and MHO. 1VIHb is the malicious attacker. When 
the RREQ goes out from MHa looking for a route to MHd, MHb forwards the RREQ to MHd, 
but gives the best metric for the route. Therefore, when MHd sends the RREP back to MHa
the route it chooses goes through MHb. This compromises not only the integrity of the route, 
but the data as well if the attacker changes any data as it passes through its hop on the route. 
Corrupted Nodes 
A corrupted node can not only damage the integrity of the route., but the integrity of 
the data as well. Little information is provided in the protocol to protect in the integrity of 
the data except for what is being used by other layers. The integrity of the route can be 
compromised by a node stating that it has the best route, and then never establishing that 
route for the source node. It could also pass along corrupted information as part of the route. 
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Impersonation and Spoofing 
Impersonation and spoofing greatly affect the integrity of the ad-hoc network. In 
AODV there is a large trust relationship that a mobile host is providing the correct IP 
address. This trust relationship will be explored later, but if a malicious attacker spoofs its IP 
or impersonates another mobile host, there is very little way to know this. Therefore a 
malicious user can easily exploit the IP trust relationship and collect and disseminate false 
data that other users believe to be correct. Looking at Figure 9, we see an example network. 
Mobile host A (MHa) is the mobile host that is being spoofed. Mobile host A' is the mobile 
host that is spoofing A. 
MHa' 
MHa 
Figure 9 —Example Network for Spoofing 
In this example for MHa' to spoof MHa it need only to initiate a RREQ with MHO as 
the destination. In the packets MHa' will provide the IP of MHa and the MAC of MHa. 
When the RREQ goes out from MHa' it is seen by MHr and eventually passed on to MHO, 
and the RREP is sent to establish the route. MHO has no reason not to trust MHa because of 
the trust relationship built on IP addresses. Even when MHa sees the RREQ coming from 
MHa' it will not suspect a security breach as long as the sequence. number is large enough. 
MHa will simply discard the RREQ because the originator's IP address is itself. The feature 
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of the protocol that helps prevent multiple RREQs from storming the network is therefore 
used against itself during the impersonation. 
5.3 Threats to Availability 
Denial of Service Attacks 
Analysis of AODV's susceptibility to denial of service reveals two major schemes for 
attacking AODV. The first attack is perpetrated if enough traffic is generated by a malicious 
user or users, then routing information such as RREQs and RREPs cannot be exchanged and 
no new routes can be established. Also, there may be key nodes through which all 
information is flowing, and if this node cannot communicate because a malicious hacker 
queries false routes from it, then the ad-hoc network is effectively partitioned. The second 
way that a denial of service can take place is by a malicious hacker responding to a RREQ 
with the best metric route, and then never forwarding the traffic once data is sent. This also 
takes place if the attacker spoofs itself to be the destination and then discards all information 
headed for that destination. 
Improper Ivey Management 
The AODV protocol neither helps nor hinders the possibility of improper key 
management, but it does lead to availability issues. Because the protocol does not specify a 
key management strategy then it would have to lie either below or above AODV in the 
protocol stack. If the key management strategy lies below AODV in the protocol stack, then 
AODV will not affect the key management. However, if the key management lies above 
AODV in the protocol stack, then steps would have to be taken to assure that proper 
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authentication is taking place in the distribution of keys because of the IP trust relationship 
that AODV relies upon. 
Sleep Deprivation and Frequency Jamming 
Sleep deprivation and frequency jamming, while great threats to network security, lie 
more in the physical and data link layer realms of the ad-hoc network. However, because 
AODV utilizes the mobile hosts to route information, the mobile hosts must stay awake 
longer, and therefore consume more power than in a single hop network. There is no 
mechanism in the protocol for a mobile host to only be able to receive data and not help pass 
it along other than always discarding RREQs so that it will not be used in the route, but its 
neighbors are still able to reach it because of the `Hello' beacon that it broadcasts 
periodically. 
5.4 Trust Relationships 
Exposing a trust relationship is one of the greatest threats to the security of a protocol. 
In AODV there is a core trust relationship believing the correctness of the IP addresses of the 
mobile nodes. As is evidenced in the previous threats, almost all of the attacks occur because 
the mobile hosts in the network believe the mobile host's authenticity based on the IP address 
given in a packet. The features of the protocol that prevent RREQ flooding are also used 
against themselves when a mobile host sees its own IP address on an incoming RREQ and 
discards the packet. It is because of this trust relationship that AODV is so open to spoofing 
attacks and any of the above attacks that take advantage of the IP of another mobile host. A 
method to prevent this is described in Secure AODV (SADOV) [12]. However, the approach 
taking in SADOV only utilizes a signature on messages. Because of the nature of wireless 
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ad-hoc networks, this is not a very viable solution. How can a corrupted mobile host be 
prevented from assigning or verifying the signatures? The error prone transmission nature of 
wireless networks makes it difficult to distribute signatures to all the mobile hosts in a large 
scale. One way to resolve the problem of the IP trust relationship in AODV is to rely on the 
data link layer to provide authentication for all mobile hosts. The problem with this 
approach, however is that all mobile hosts must be within one hop of a controlling station to 
be authenticated, but then the network would no longer be truly ad-hoc. There is no easy 
solution to the trust relationship that AODV is built upon. Therefore as it stands AODV is 
not an ideal protocol for high security applications. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.15ummar_y 
The main objective of this thesis was the systematic study of a popular wireless 
network routing protocol in order to evaluate its ability to support secure communications. 
In support of that goal this thesis accomplished four things. It first examined current ad-hoc 
network routing protocols with regard to the underlying algorithms for route discovery and 
message delivery. To accomplish this goal this thesis examines five network routing 
algorithms for wireless ad-hoc. networks: DSDV, WRP, AODV, TORA, and DSR. This 
portion of the thesis summarized the operation of each protocol in order to give the reader a 
foundation of wireless routing protocols to further the understanding the state of research that 
is being conducted in the wireless environment. 
The next section of this thesis entailed a detailed demonstration of the route discovery 
of one of the more popular routing protocols, the AODV protocol. This section gave the 
reader a deeper understanding of the AODV protocol and the underlying operations that 
occur in a route discovery of AODV. The thesis detailed the types of messages that are 
exchanged, and how these exchanges occur. 
From there the security vulnerabilities of the wireless networking environment were 
described, and finally the security vulnerabilities of the wireless environment were mapped 
to the AODV protocol for analysis of AODV's security properties. The next step that this 
thesis took was to examine the wireless medium, and the security challenges that are faced in 
the wireless medium. This creates a foundation of understanding that allows for the AODV 
protocol to be compared to for security weakness. This thesis demonstrated that for the three 
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main goals of security confidentiality, integrity, and availability the AODV protocol. is not 
designed to support secure communications. 
AODV as it stands by itself is unable to handle the problems of eavesdropping, 
failures in authentication, failures in key management, the compromising of mobile nodes, 
man-in-the-middle attacks, corrupted nodes, impersonation and spoofing, and denial of 
service attacks. As is shown in the previous chapter there are some measures that can be 
taken to increase the security for each problem, but the underlying AODV protocol does 
nothing for secure communications. It is therefore concluded that the AODV protocol is not 
a viable protocol for communicating in a wireless ad-hoc network. 
6.2 Future Work 
The fact that wireless ad-hoc networks is a relatively new area of research creates an 
opportunity for plethora of further work in this area. Three directions that future work can be 
taken from this thesis are: the simulation of the security vulnerabilities, enhancing the 
AODV protocol for security, and a comparison of AODV against other ad-hoc protocols for 
security. 
Simulating the security vulnerabilities of AODV can take two different paths. The 
first way that the simulations can take place is through the use of a network simulator tool 
such as NS. This would allow a researcher to easily implement the protocol and run 
controlled experiments to determine the ability of AODV to caarry on secure communications. 
By running the simulations through the NS tool each scenario can be easily carried out and 
quickly adapted to new situations. The other way in which these vulnerabilities can be 
simulated is through actual implementation of the AODV protocol on a number of machines 
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and caarrying out each attack on the protocol. The relative merits of both ways are fairly 
similar because research between using a simulator tool and actual implementation has 
shown them to be fairly close approximations. 
Another vein for future work is enhancing the AODV protocol for security. Steps can 
be taken to correct some of the oversights in security that AODV contains. If IPSEC is 
utilized during communications this can dramatically decrease the ability to eavesdrop data, 
routing information, and man-in-the-middle attacks. By implementing upper layer security 
measures other security vulnerabilities can also be circumvented. Another direction that this 
future work can take is to actually alter the protocol with security in mind trying to fix some 
of the inherent trust relationships that are built into AODV. 
The final area for future work that this thesis will discuss, comparing AODV against 
other protocols for security can take on many different directions as well. Not only can the 
comparisons be made by analyzing the algorithms of the other routing protocols in the same 
way that this thesis did and creating a matrix of vulnerabilities that each protocol can be rated 
against, but each protocol can be simulated against the security vulnerabilities to determine 
whether or not they can be utilized for secure communications. 
Given the nature of ad-hoc networks and the inherent trust that they are built upon, 
securing these networks will be a difficult task. As was detailed in this paper there are many 
vulnerabilities in the wireless environment that make secure computing difficult, but this is a 
necessary task in current age that we are in given the worth of information in today's 
businesses, governments, and militaries. 
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